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  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
In August of 1996, a jury found Gent Mosby guilty of the March 26, 1994 
murder of Officer Steven Hodge. On this direct appeal, he challenges his 
convictions on constitutional, evidentiary, and procedural grounds. We will affirm. 
I 
 Officer Steven Hodge’s murder took place shortly after 11:00 pm on 
March 26, 1994. He was shot fourteen times by at least two people using four 
different guns. Police found only one piece of physical evidence at the scene, a 
towel with gun residue. It was found near a bush close to Officer Hodge’s home 
and appeared to have been recently placed there.  
 Earlier on the day of the murder, two witnesses saw Mosby with two of his 
codefendants—Carl Fleming and Ricky Vanterpool—at a store Mosby ran called 
New York’s Latest Fashions. One of these witnesses, Gwentin Sellwood, testified 
at trial that he saw them there and that he saw Mosby remove three guns from a 
paper bag, two of which he handed to Fleming and Vanterpool. Sellwood also saw 
a long gun with a damaged handle on the counter behind Mosby. On the back of a 
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chair near Mosby, he saw a towel similar to the one found near the crime scene. 
Finally, Sellwood also heard Mosby tell his codefendants that he would pick them 
up at 11:30 pm so that they could take care of “serious business.” The other 
witness, Vincent Daniel, also visited the store and saw Mosby with Vanterpool. 
While Daniel was there, he heard the “cranking of a gun” from the bathroom. 
 Witnesses Bernice Celestine, Eustace Sorhaindo, and Shorn Pennyfeather all 
heard gun shots the evening of the murder and saw four men dressed in black near 
Officer Hodge’s home shortly before or after his murder. Only Sorhaindo was able 
to identify at trial any of the four men he saw. He identified Mosby and another 
codefendant, Pedro Harris. He later recanted his identification of Harris, but he 
never withdrew his identification of Mosby.  
 Two days after the murder, Sellwood again encountered Mosby. This time, 
Mosby had just been questioned by police about the murder of a police officer. 
Sellwood helped Mosby clean out New York’s Latest Fashions store and heard 
him exclaim several times that he would not go to jail. Several months later, 
Sellwood encountered Mosby, Fleming, and Vanterpool. Mosby pointedly stopped 
Sellwood on the street to tell him that “whatsoever you hear in the store or 
whatsoever you see in the store, don’t ever leave me hear it or otherwise me and 
the boys them will take you out.” 
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 Mosby offered two defenses at trial. First, he tried to provide an alibi for the 
evening of the murder by explaining that he was at strip clubs. Second, he claimed 
that the murder was committed by corrupt Virgin Islands police officers who knew 
that Officer Hodge was about to report them. In support of this second defense, 
Mosby offered a recording in which a person involved in the drug business 
allegedly explained to a confidential informant (“CI”) that Virgin Islands police 
officers had approached him to hire a contract killer to murder Officer Hodge. The 
person in the recording was allegedly Vargas Paniagua, who purportedly assisted 
in the murder because Officer Hodge owed Paniagua cocaine money. Despite 
Mosby’s attempts, Paniagua was not produced to testify at trial, the recording was 
not admitted into evidence, and the CI’s identity was not revealed.  
 On August 19, 1996, in the Virgin Islands Superior Court,1
                                                 
1 At the time of trial, the trial court was known as the Territorial Court. Starting in 
October 2004, the Territorial Court became known as the Superior Court. We will 
refer to the trial court as the Superior Court.  
 a jury found 
Mosby guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, unauthorized 
possession of a firearm, and threatening a witness. On November 16, 1996, the 
Superior Court denied Mosby’s motion for a judgment of acquittal or, in the 
alternative, a new trial. He then filed a timely appeal to the Appellate Division of 
the Virgin Islands District Court. Mosby v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, No. 1997-
0015-1, 2011 WL 4357301, at *3 (D.V.I. Sept. 16, 2011) (per curiam). After an 
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unexplained fifteen-year delay, the Appellate Division affirmed Mosby’s 
conviction on January 22, 2010. Mosby, 2011 WL 4357301, at *3. Mosby then 
filed a timely appeal to this Court. 
 The Appellate Division had jurisdiction to hear Mosby’s appeal pursuant to 
48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a) and (d). We review the Superior Court’s rulings using the 
same standards of review as those employed by the Appellate Division. Semper v. 
Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1236 (3d Cir. 1988); Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Lewis, 620 
F.3d 359, 364 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2010). 
II 
Mosby challenges his conviction on five grounds.2
                                                 
2 Mosby also suggests that Sorhaindo’s in-court and out-of-court identifications 
should have been suppressed. He fails, however, to provide any legal basis for his 
in-court identification argument or accurate record citations for his out-of-court-
identification argument. Accordingly, these arguments have not been properly 
presented and will not be addressed. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182–83 
(3d Cir. 1993); Rebuck v. Vogel, 713 F.2d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1983). Mosby’s 
change of venue argument is similarly flawed because he fails to provide any legal 
or factual support for the argument. 
 Three arguments relate to 
the Paniagua tape recording. Mosby argues that the Superior Court violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process when it denied his motion for a writ 
of habeas corpus ad testificandum requiring Paniagua to testify, that the Superior 
Court erred by determining that the tape was inadmissible hearsay, and that the 
Superior Court was incorrect to deny his motion to disclose the identity of the CI 
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who recorded the conversation. Besides the Paniagua-related arguments, Mosby 
makes two additional arguments. First, he argues that the testimony of Athnell 
Coker violated the rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), because it 
contained the confession of one of Mosby’s codefendants, Maurice Richardson, 
that impermissibly implicated Mosby. Second, he argues that the transcript of 
Sorhaindo’s testimony should have been read back to the jury in its entirety, even 
though they requested only a portion of it. None of these arguments have merit. 
 Mosby’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was not violated 
because Paniagua’s testimony would not have been favorable. United States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867–68 (1982). To assert this Sixth Amendment 
right to produce a witness, a defendant must show (among other things) “that the 
excluded testimony would have been material and favorable to his defense.” Gov’t 
of Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). Mosby argues that Paniagua’s testimony would 
have been material and favorable because the tape allegedly showed that if 
Paniagua were to testify truthfully, then he would explain that he was approached 
by Virgin Islands police officers who wanted his help to hire a contract killer to 
murder Officer Hodge. During a pretrial proceeding, however, Paniagua denied 
under oath that he participated in the conversation recorded or a conversation 
similar to it. Mosby thus failed to show that Panaigua’s testimony at trial would 
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have been favorable or material.  
Mosby contends that the required showing would have been met if he had 
been given a chance to confront Paniagua’s denial of involvement in the murder 
with the recording, which the parties agree constitutes hearsay. We are not 
persuaded. The favorability determination must be based on a witness’s actual 
testimony and admissible evidence. This is so because defendants cannot 
circumvent the rules of evidence by calling witnesses solely to impeach them with 
evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 
412, 428–29 (3d Cir. 1985). The Superior Court therefore did not violate Mosby’s 
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process by refusing to compel Paniagua’s 
testimony.3
The Superior Court also did not err in concluding that the tape was not 
admissible under either Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as a statement against 
 
                                                 
3 Similarly, the Superior Court’s denial of Mosby’s motion for a writ of habeas 
corpus ad testificandum was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cruz-
Jiminez, 977 F.2d 95, 99 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that our standard of review for 
denials of the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is for abuse of discretion). 
This writ may be denied if “the witness’s testimony is only peripherally relevant 
. . . .” Id. at 100. Paniagua’s denial of his participation in the conversation is not 
relevant at all because it would not make any “fact more or less probable.” Fed. R. 
Evid. 401(a). That the Superior Court’s denial of Mosby’s motion was a reversal of 
its initial decision to grant it is also not an abuse of discretion because trial judges 
are permitted to test the proffered evidence used to support a motion. See Luce v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984). 
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interest or the residual exception in Rule 807.4
Furthermore, the record does not provide any reason to conclude that the 
 This decision was not an abuse of 
discretion because the tape was inadequately substantiated by other evidence. See 
United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that we 
review admissibility rulings for abuse of discretion). For a statement to be admitted 
under either of these exceptions, the statement’s content and context must 
demonstrate its trustworthiness. United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 835–36 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (explaining that trustworthy circumstances is one of two requirements 
for the statement against interest exception to apply); United States v. Bailey, 581 
F.2d 341, 346–47 (3d Cir. 1978) (explaining that the residual exception can be 
used when trustworthiness and “high degrees of probativeness and necessity are 
present”). The record supports the Superior Court’s conclusion that the statements 
on the tape were untrustworthy. There is simply no evidence to support the tape’s 
suggestion that a hit man was brought to the Virgin Islands. If anything, the 
evidence at trial suggests that a hit man was not involved because of the multiple 
guns used in the killing. Mosby does not explain why the officers would pay a hit 
man $50,000 to join them in murdering a police officer, rather than to simply kill 
the officer himself.  
                                                 
4 The Superior Court’s ruling refers to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), which 
was the location of the residual exception at the time of the trial. The exception 
now appears in Rule 807. 
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Superior Court was clearly unreasonable in determining  that the circumstances did 
not indicate trustworthiness. There is evidencing supporting the conclusion that the 
CI was financially motivated to fabricate evidence and had been an unreliable 
informant in the past. Furthermore, the tape does show that Paniagua’s statement 
was not spontaneous and was made when he had reason to enhance his criminal 
reputation to the CI by sounding “all powerful.” Accordingly, the Superior Court’s 
ruling that the statements on the tape were inadmissible hearsay was not an abuse 
of discretion. 
 Mosby’s final Paniagua-related argument is that the identity of the CI, 
known as SKS, should have been disclosed so that Mosby could authenticate the 
statements on the tape. We review the Superior Court’s denial of Mosby’s motion 
to disclose SKS’s identity for abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 302 
F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2002). A defendant is generally not entitled to the identity 
of a CI when “the informant was not an active participant or eyewitness, but rather 
a mere tipster” to the reported offense. United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 197–98 
(3d Cir. 1981). Here, SKS was very similar to a tipster because he had no role in 
the murder of Officer Hodge and only happened upon the information in the tape 
as a part of an unrelated drug investigation. SKS thus could not provide any 
information beyond what was already on the tape, thereby rendering his identity of 
minimal value to the preparation of Mosby’s defense. Cf. Roviaro v. United States, 
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353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (explaining that disclosure of confidential informants’ 
identities is guided by the balancing of “the public interest in protecting the flow of 
information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense”). The Superior 
Court’s denial of Mosby’s request to disclose SKS’s identity was not, therefore, an 
abuse of discretion. 
 Aside from the issues relating to Paniagua, Mosby also challenges the 
testimony of Athnell Coker. Coker recounted the confession of one of Mosby’s 
codefendants, Maurice Richardson, who did not testify at trial. Coker testified that 
“they went down Lindberg Bay in the bushes and stake out and waited until Hodge 
came out of his house and shoot him.” Mosby argues that Coker’s use of “they” 
impermissibly implicated him in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136–37. Mosby also argues that the same 
improper implication resulted from both the prosecutor’s unanswered questions 
regarding the number of people and types of guns involved and in his closing 
argument that reformulated Coker’s statement. These arguments are meritless. 
In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s introduction into 
evidence of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession violates a defendant’s right 
under the Confrontation Clause when “there is a strong implication that the non-
testifying codefendant’s confession refers to the defendant.” Pabon v. Mahanoy, 
654 F.3d 385, 393 (3d Cir. 2011). The use of “they” here is not sufficient to create 
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an unconstitutionally strong implication. At no point in the testimony does Coker 
identify or mention the activities of other people in the crime, much less imply that 
Mosby was involved. Furthermore, the Superior Court properly stopped Coker 
from answering the prosecutor’s questions about the number of people and the 
number of guns. This prevented any possible implication that Coker’s use of 
“they” referred to the other defendants in the courtroom. Cf. United States v. 
Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding a Bruton violation when 
the redaction of the codefendant’s confession “sharply incriminated” the 
nonconfessing defendant). And though the prosecutor may have suggested in his 
closing statement that Richardson meant Mosby when he said “they,” this is 
insufficient because the testimony and other evidence left open other possible 
inferences that the jury was free to make. See Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394, 
399 (3d Cir. 2004). Coker’s testimony, therefore, did not violate Mosby’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation as understood in Bruton. 
 Mosby’s final argument is that the Superior Court erred by reading back 
only the portion of Sorhaindo’s testimony that the jury requested, rather than 
Sorhaindo’s entire testimony. Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding which 
portions of testimony to reread to a jury upon its request. United States v. Wright-
Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 174 (3d Cir. 1986), superseded on other grounds by statute 
as recognized in United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 
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1993). District courts do not abuse this discretion by limiting the part read back to 
the part requested by the jury, even though the defendant may have wanted more 
read. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d at 174. Here, the Superior Court read only that 
portion requested by the jury, which even Mosby’s trial counsel recognized was all 
that was required. The Court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion. 
III 
 For these reasons, we will affirm Mosby’s convictions. 
 
 
